William Stern on the "psychical time of presence". Historical and theoretical study of a cognitive model of time perception and autonoetic consciousness

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Table of contents

Abstract

Introduction

1. The 19th century psychological context
1.1. The issue of unity of conscious experience in the late 19th century German psychology
1.1.1. The psychological foundations of the experience of the relationships between sensory contents
1.1.2. Fechner's "sensations of difference"
1.1.3. Stumpf's "sensory judgments"
1.1.4. Ehrenfels' "structural qualities"
1.2. The question of time perception in the 19th century psychology
1.2.1. Perception of successiveness and immediate continuity of conscious experience
1.2.2. Herbart's model of time experience
1.2.3. Lotze and the theory of the temporal signs
1.2.4. Time perception as a temporally-extended psychical phenomenon: James' "specious present"

2. Commentary of Stern's 1897 paper on the "psychical time of presence"
2.1. The irrelevance of "the dogma of the instantaneity"
2.2. The subjective present is mediated by a temporally-extended act of consciousness
2.3. The phenomenon of the "projection" into the time of presence
2.4. Time of presence and memory
2.5. The duration of the time of presence

3. Critical examination of the theory of the time of presence
3.1. Historical and conceptual significance of Stern's views for the theories of time perception and memory
3.2. Time of presence, stream of consciousness, continuity and unity of conscious experience
3.3. Problematic aspects and limits of Stern's model
3.3.1. The issue of intuitiveness
3.3.2. Ontological difficulties
3.3.3. The issue of the discretness of the time of presence
3.3.4. Conditions and modalities of the actualization of the time of presence
3.3.5. The issue of the duration of the presence time
3.3.6. The neural correlates of the time of presence and the binding problem
3.3.7. The issue of perception of date and duration: date and duration are not experienced

intuitively

4. Proposal of a general model of perception of date and duration on the basis of the theory of the time of presence
4.1. The issue of the reconstruction of date and duration in the time of presence
4.2. Cognitive model of date perception
4.3. Cognitive model of duration perception
4.4. The interdependence of date perception and of duration perception

5. Conclusion: Posterity and relevance of the theory of the psychical time of presence in current cognitive psychology and neurosciences
5.1. A decisive theoretical contribution
5.2. Outlines of a general model of time perception
5.3. Stern's legacy: The theory of the time of presence in the eyes of current research on episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness

Endnotes

References

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